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Abstract
It is argued that the criticism of Byrne and Hall (1999) of the ar-
gument of Chalmers (1996) in favor of the Everett-style interpretation
is incorrect.
1 Introduction
Byrne and Hall (1999) criticized the argument of Chalmers (1996) in favor
of the Everett-style interpretation. They claimed to show \the deep and
underappreciated aw in any Everett-style interpretation". I will argue that
it is possible to interpret Chalmers's writing in such a way that most of the
criticism by Byrne and Hall does not apply. (Recently I have learned that
Chalmers himself (2000) partly accept the criticism, so my interpretation of
his writing might dier from his original proposal.) In any case the general
criticism of Byrne and Hall of the many-worlds interpretation is unfounded.
The recent recognition that the Everett-style interpretations are good (if
not the best) interpretations of quantum mechanics has, therefore, not been
negated.
It is probably impossible to present an interpretation of quantum mechan-
ics in unambiguous way without writing equations. Chalmers's presentation
of Everett-style interpretation also can be understood in dierent ways. In-
stead of equations Chalmers used some technical jargon of quantum theory,
however, some words like \substates" have no clear meaning even for physi-
cists. Byrne and Hall (BH) interpreted Chalmers's jargon in a way which
leads to contradictions. In this note I will argue that by taking a more posi-
tive approach, one can see in Chalmers's writing a consistent (although not
necessarily very persuasive) argument.
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In the second part of their paper BH claimed to show not only that
Chalmers has failed to establish his Everett-inspired interpretation, but that
\anything resembling it should not be taken seriously". Their rst point is
of a general character: if the spaces of states in two theories are identical but
the dynamics is not, it is not obvious that the interpretation of these states
in the two theories must be identical too. BH point out that this is the
situation regarding the interpretation of quantum states in the orthodox and
the Everett interpretations. I will argue that although their general argument
is correct, its application is not. There is enough similarity between the
dynamics that makes the identication plausible. The second point of BH
is that the Everett-style interpretation has less \substantive content" than
the orthodox interpretation. This is because in the Everett (many-worlds)
interpretation there is no counterpart of \outcome probabilities", the concept
of the orthodox interpretation associated with a system in a superposition of
eigenstates of some variable. I will argue that the denition of the probability
of an outcome in the framework of the many-worlds interpretation which I
recently proposed solves this diculty and makes this BH criticism obsolete.
In Section 2 I will adopt the BH interpretation of Chalmers and will show
(in a dierent from BH way) how it leads to a contradiction. In Section 3
I propose an alternative interpretation of Chalmers's writing which leads to
a consistent argument. In Section 4 I critically analyze the general argu-
ments of BH against the Everett-style interpretations. Finally, in Section 5
I summarize my defense of the many-worlds interpretation.
2 Byrne and Hall interpretation and a con-
tradiction in the Chalmers argument
The central thesis of Chalmers quoted by BH is the principle of organizational
preservation under superposition:
OPUS
If a computation is implemented by a system in a maximal physi-
cal state P , it is also implemented by a system in a superposition
of P with orthogonal physical states.(Chalmers, 350)
Consider a simple model: a computer which performs calculations in a clas-
sical way. If at time t0 the computer receives a classical input (a particular
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punching of its keyboard), then it evolves in time is such a way that it is
always in a \classical" state. This means that all the registers of the com-
puter at all times are in some denite states (exited or not exited) i.e., not
in a superposition of excited and not excited. Suppose that P corresponds
to a computation of a square of a number 5, while Q corresponds to a com-
putation of a square of a number 10. Denote jP (t)i a quantum state of the
computer at time t performing the calculation of the square of 5, while jQ(t)i
a quantum state of the computer at time t performing the calculation of the
square of 10. In the two computations at any time the registers must be in
dierent states, therefore, jP (t)i is orthogonal to jQ(t)i. Thus, according to
OPUS the computer in a quantum state
jR+(t)i  1=
p
2(jP (t)i+ jQ(t)i); (1)
also implements computation of the square of 5. The quantum state
jR (t)i  1=
p
2(jP (t)i   jQ(t)i); (2)
is orthogonal to jR+(t)i. BH read Chalmers in such a way that OPUS can be
applied to jR+(t)i and jR (t)i, i.e., that the superposition 1=
p
2(jR+(t)i  
jR (t)i) also implements computation of the square of 5. But,
1p
2
(jR+(t)i jR (t)i) = 1
2
[(jP (t)i+jQ(t)i) (jP (t)i jQ(t)i)] = jQ(t)i: (3)
The state jQ(t)i corresponds to the computation of the square of 10. It
corresponds to the punching of a dierent input, it has dierent registers
activated during the calculation, it has dierent output. Clearly, it does not
implement computation of the square of 5.
Applying this direct reading of Chalmers, BH reached somewhat dierent
contradiction which lead them to reject Chalmers's approach.
3 An alternative interpretation of Chalmers
It is possible to read Chalmers in another way such that the contradictions
of the type described in the previous section do not arise. Let us make the
following modication of the OPUS principle:
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OPUS0
If a computation is implemented by a system in a maximal physi-
cal state P which is not a superposition, it is also implemented by
a system in a superposition of P with orthogonal physical states.
This modied principle can be applied to P and Q, but it cannot be applied
to R+ and R  and, therefore, one cannot reach the contradiction described
above as well as the contradictions described by BH.
One might see that OPUS0 is what Chalmers actually had in mind even
though he did not say it explicitly. Indeed, another way to see the dierence
between OPUS (as read by BH) and OPUS0 is that in the latter it is required
that P corresponds to a single experience. Chalmers's rst denition of the
OPUS principle is:
If the theory predicts that a system in a maximal physical
state P gives rise to an associated maximal phenomenal state
E, then the theory predicts that a system in a superposition of
P with some orthogonal physical states will also give rise to E.
(349)
The word \associated" hints that Chalmers meant that there is only one
experience (\phenomenal state E" in Chalmers's notation) corresponding to
physical state P .
In fact, BH saw a possibility of reading OPUS as OPUS0. The \(Version
of) OPUS" described in their section 5.2.3 is essentially OPUS0. They re-
jected this because they understood that Chalmers denies the existence of
preferred basis. BH are correct in their criticism that without preferred basis
there is no way to distinguish between quantum state which is a \superposi-
tion" and a state which is not a \superposition". Thus, the modication of
OPUS to OPUS0 cannot be done without assuming preferred basis.
We can read Chalmers in such a way that we do not run into inconsis-
tency: Chalmers only objects to the claim that the mathematical formalism
of quantum mechanics, i.e. the Schrodinger equation, leads to preferred ba-
sis. He cannot object to the existence of preferred basis, but he views it as
arising from his theory of consciousness. This reading of Chalmers is justied
by the following quotations:
Everett assumes that a superposed brain state will have a
number of distinct subjects of experience associated with it, but
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he does nothing to justify this assumption. It is clear that this
matter depends crucially on a theory of consciousness. A similar
suggestion is made by Penrose (1989): \... a theory of conscious-
ness would be needed before the many-worlds view can be squared
with what one actually observes" (348)
... last three strategies are all indirect strategies, attempting
to explain the discreteness of experience by explaining an under-
lying discreteness of macroscopic reality. An alternative strategy
is to answer the question about experience directly. (349)
Before discussing quantum mechanics, Chalmers argues for a principle of
organizational invariance:
POI
Given any system that has conscious experiences, then any sys-
tem that has the same ne-grained functional organization will
have qualitatively identical experiences. (249)
The main diculty which BH see in putting together the principle of
organization invariance together with OPUS follows from the same misinter-
pretation of Chalmers. If there is no preferred basis then they have reasons
to say:
... perceptual experience is (more or less) entirely illusory.
When you seem to see a voltmeter needle pointing to `10' your
perceptual experience is probably veridical: the needle (if, indeed,
we can sensibly speak of such a thing) is not pointing to `10' or
anywhere else.
However, accepting preferred basis, even if it is dened by the concept of
experience itself, resolves the diculty: the pointer does point to `10' and in
addition, in parallel worlds, to other values too.
Chalmers claims that his independently motivated theory of consciousness
predicts that even in the world which is in a giant superposition there are
subjects who experience a discrete world. He bases his argument on \the
claim that consciousness arises from implementation of an appropriate com-
putation." Taking the model of a simple computer presented above, we can
follow (at least approximately) his proof on p. 350. Projection of the super-
posed state on \the hyperplane of P" might mean projection of the quantum
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state of the computer in a \superposed" state at the initial time on the state
corresponding to the input of calculating square of the number 5 which leads
to quantum states of the various registers at later times corresponding to this
calculation. The parallel between the calculation and experience yields the
desired result, but accepting this parallel is relying on our experience. So,
if we read Chalmers as BH do, that he claims to deduce \what the world is
like if the Schrodinger equation is all" without the guide of our experience,
then they have a valid criticism. However, Chalmers admits that Schrodinger
equation cannot be all:
... the only physical principle needed in quantum mechanics
is the Schrodinger equation, and the measurement postulate and
other basic principles are unnecessary baggage. To be sure, we
need psychophysical principles as well, but we need those prin-
ciples in any case, and it turns out that the principles that are
plausible on independent grounds can do the requisite work here.
(350-351)
I feel that these \independent grounds" are connected with our experience
in a stronger way than one might imagine reading Chalmers. But this fact
cannot lead to rejection of this approach as BH claim.
4 Byrne and Hall against any Everett-style
interpretation
BH start their argument by pointing out that the orthodox quantum theory
and the Everett interpretation formally dened on the same \family of state
spaces" and that the dierence is only in dynamics. Then they say that
because of the dierence in dynamics it does not follow that the quantum
state corresponding to a particular experience in the orthodox theory will
correspond to the same belief (if at any) in the framework of the Everett
theory.
This might be considered as a criticism of Chalmers if one reads him
as saying that Everett theory predicts what our experiences should be, but
usually this connection is postulated in Everett-style theories. There is a
strong motivation for this postulate. The orthodox theory is dened only
on a (tiny) part of the space of all quantum states: macroscopic quantum
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systems cannot be in a \superposition states". The dynamics of the allowed
states between quantum measurements is identical to the dynamics of the
quantum states in the Everett theory. Let us discuss the example analyzed
by BH at the end of p.385. When a state  is a state of an observer who has
the belief that the measurement outcome was \up" in the orthodox theory,
the dynamics will tell that she will write \up" in her lab-book. The dynamics
of the state  in the Everett theory leads to the same action. This justies
considering  to be a \belief vector" in the Everett theory too.
BH proceed with their criticism claiming that Everett's interpretation
has less of \substantiative content" because when a quantum system is in a
superposition of eigenstates with dierent eigenvalues of some quantity M,
the orthodox interpretation associates probabilities to the various outcomes,
while the Everett theory does not.
It is true that there is a diculty with the concept of probability in
the framework of the Everett-style interpretation. The Everett theory is
a deterministic theory and it does not have a genuine randomness of the
collapse of the orthodox interpretation. A deterministic theory might have
the concept of ignorance probability, but it is not easy to nd somebody
who is ignorant of the result of a quantum experiment: it is senseless to
ask what is the probability that an observer will obtain a particular result,
because she will obtain all results for which there are a non-zero probabilities
according to the orthodox approach. It seems also senseless to ask what is
the probability of the observers in various branches (these are persons with
the same name and the same memories about events which took place before
the measurements, but who live in dierent branches corresponding to the
dierent outcomes) to obtain various results, since obviously the probability
to obtain the result \M = mi" in branch \j" is 1 if i = j and it is 0 if i 6= j.
These are not the quantum probabilities we are looking for.
However, BH cannot dismiss the Everett-style interpretations without
even discussing current proposals to deal with this problem (Lockwood et al.
1996, Saunders 1998, Deutsch 1999, etc.) Here, I will sketch my proposal
for solving this diculty (Vaidman 1998, 2000). The splitting into various
branches occurs usually before the time when the observers in these branches
become aware of the outcome of the measurement. (To ensure this we may
ask the observer to keep her eyes close during the measurement.) Thus, an
observer in each branch is ignorant about the outcome of the measurement
and she can (while any external person cannot!) dene the the ignorance
probability for the outcome of the measurement. She will do so using stan-
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dard probability postulate: the probability of an outcome is proportional to
the square of the amplitude of the corresponding branch. Moreover, since
observers in all these branches have identical concept of ignorance proba-
bility and since they all are descendants of the observer who performed the
experiment, we can associate probability for an outcome of a measurement
for this observer in the sense that this is the common ignorance probability
of her descendants in various branches.
The fact that I have used a probability postulate here does not spoil the
argument: I had to show that substantive content of Everett interpretation
is not less than that of the orthodox interpretation. The latter has the prob-
ability postulate as well. What was done here (and what was not trivial
from the beginning) was to present a way which allows to dene probability
in the frame of the many-worlds interpretation. This denition also resolves
the diculty recently discussed by Lewis (2000). He argued that a believer
in the many-worlds (minds) interpretation should agree to play a \quantum
Russian Roulette" provided the death is instantaneous. Indeed, the instan-
taneity makes it dicult to establish the probability postulate, but after it
has been justied in the wide range of other situations it is natural to apply
the postulate for all cases.
The last argument of BH relies on their claim that Everett-style interpre-
tation lacks \statistical algorithm". Since the ignorance probability dened
above generates the same statistical algorithm as the the orthodox theory,
this argument does not hold either.
5 Summary
The main claim of BH is \that any Everett-style interpretation should be re-
jected". The basis of their argument is the observation that neither Chalmers
nor anybody else can answer the question: \What the world is like if the
Shrodinger equation is all?" It is true that this question is much more dif-
cult to answer in the framework of the Everett-style interpretation relative
to interpretations which do not have multitude of worlds. \The world is
everything which exist" is not a valid denition. Moreover, the Shrodinger
equation itself cannot dene the concept of a \world". The world is the
concept dened by conscious beings and it requires the analysis of the mind-
body connection. Chalmers's theory of consciousness provides an answer.
One might argue how substantial his answer is, but even if there is no a
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detailed answer to this question today, one cannot reject the Everett inter-
pretation. It suces that Everett's theory is consistent with what we see
as our world. It is so superior to the alternatives from the physics point of
view, because it avoids randomness and action at a distance in Nature (e.g.,
see Vaidman 2000), that it is still preferable in spite of the fact that it is less
satisfactory from the philosophical point of view. Therefore, even if BH were
able to point out a diculty in obtaining the interpretation out of the \bare
theory" this would not be enough for rejecting the Everett interpretation.
Moreover, I have argued that the BH have not presented persuasive argu-
ments showing the diculty. Their rst argument is that it is not obvious
that the correspondence between quantum states and classical properties in
the orthodox quantum mechanics can be transformed as it is to the Everett
interpretation. This argument does not take into account the similarity in
dynamics which justies the identication. Their other arguments rely on the
well known diculty in the interpretation of probability in the many-worlds
interpretation disregard recently proposed solutions of this problem.
In summary, BH were not able to show a aw in Everett-style interpre-
tations. The temptation to appeal to the philosophy of mind in interpreting
quantum mechanics, in particular, the idea that a theory of mind might
help rescue from the diculties with standard interpretation is still very at-
tractive. Indeed, the Everett-style interpretation which says that physics is
described in full by the Schrodinger equation is the most satisfactory from
the physics point of view. What is left is to complete Chalmers's work, i.e.
to elaborate the connection between the quantum state evolving according
to the Schrodinger equation and our experience.
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